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Abstract
We suggest an attack on a symmetric non-ideal quantum coin-tossing protocol
suggested by Mayers Salvail and Chiba-Kohno. The analysis of the attack shows
that the protocol is insecure.
1 Introduction
The subject of two party quantum cryptography has had many twists and turns and until
now security was proven only for very weak tasks like quantum gambling [1] and cheat
sensitive bit commitment [2], [3], while many two party tasks such as bit commitment [4],
[5] , ideal coin tossing [6] and secure two party computations [7] were proven insecure.
Recently, however, Mayers,Salvail and Chiba-Kohno [8] suggested a protocol, called there-
after MSC(99). They claimed this protocol may achieve unconditionally secure non-ideal
coin tossing.
Coin tossing is a task in which two remote distrustfull parties conventionally called
Alice and Bob run a protocol that, in the case that both parties act honestly, has equal
probability to give the result 1 or 0. The protocol has another result abort which is
not obtained when both parties act honestly (except with a possibly arbitrarily small
probability). Therefore when abort is obtained the interpretation of an honest player
is that the other party deviated from the protocol. A protocol that satisfies the above
conditions is called correct.
∗E-mail:boazl@cs.huji.ac.il
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Let pb( where b = 0, 1) be the probability that the result b is obtained. A non-ideal
exact coin tossing protocol is called secure if, in the case that one of the parties cheats,
(i.e. deviates from the given protocol) the following condition: pb ≤ 1/2, is satisfied. A
non-ideal non-exact coin tossing protocol is called secure if, in the case that one of the
parties cheats, the following requirement is satisfied: pb ≤ 12 + ξ, where ξ is a security
parameter that can be made arbitrarily small.
The idea behind MSC(99), which is a non-ideal non-exact coin tossing protocol, is to build
a protocol where both parties have almost no information, on the completely random
output at first. As the protocol proceeds, they get in a slow and almost symmetric way
more and more information about the result , until both have full information on the
output. Such a protocol is supposed to overcome the generalized attacks used against
quantum bit commitment since, although at first a cheater can change the result without
being detected, he has no information about the result and therefore any change would
be useless. While at the end of the protocol, a cheater may have information about the
protocol’s result but it will be almost impossible for him to change the result undetected.
In this letter we will analyze the information flow in MSC(99) and suggest an attack
on MSC(99) in which the cheater acts honestly on the quantum level (keeps everything
possible in a superposition) until he can obtain enough (but not to much) information
about the protocol’s result. He then makes the measurement and causes the superposition
to “collapse” according to the information he obtains and his desired result. This attack
is a generalization of the standard attacks on quantum bit commitment and can be
carried out by any participant as long as the protocol is symmetric. This attack on
MSC(99) creates a non negligible bias on the protocol’s output that is independent of
the parameters of the protocol and therefore shows that the protocol is insecure.
2 Distinguishability measures
In what follows will shall use the following results from quantum information theory.
Given a quantum system whose density matrix is, with equal probability, one of two
possible density matrices ρ0, ρ1 ∈ H1 and asked to decide which one we were given, the
measurement that minimizes the error probability of the decision is a measurement of
the observable ρ0−ρ1
2
and the probability of error is:
PE(ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
− 1
4
tr|ρ0 − ρ1|, (1)
[9]. Another important quantity is the Kolmogorov distance, which is defined in the
following way:
K(ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
max
∑
µ
|tr(ρ0Eµ)− tr(ρ1Eµ)| (2)
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where the maximization is done over all possible POVM’s. The connection between these
two quantities is the following:
K(ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
tr|ρ0 − ρ1|. (3)
This shows that the measurements that optimizes K and PE (which we call EK ) are
identical. Therefore the Kolmogorov distance quantifies the deviation from a random
guess giving it a well defined operational meaning, .
The transition probability of two density matrices ρ0, ρ1 is defined as
P (ρ0, ρ1) = max|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2, (4)
where |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 are purifications of ρ0, ρ1 and the maximization runs over
all possible purifications of ρ0, ρ1. Moreover, we can fix the purification of one density
matrix and do the maximization over all purifications of the other [10]. Since different
purifications of a density matrix in H1 are related by unitary transformations on H2 the
maximum can be obtained by maximizing over unitary transformations on |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉
in H2 alone.
Another important quantity is the fidelity of two density matrices which is defined by:
F (ρ0, ρ1) = min
∑
µ
√
tr(ρ0Eµ)
√
tr(ρ1Eµ) (5)
where we minimize over all possible POVM’s. It was shown in [11] that the fidelity can
be written explicitly as
F (ρ0, ρ1) = tr
√√
ρ0ρ1
√
ρ0 (6)
and in [12] it was proven that the fidelity is related to the transition probability through:
F (ρ0, ρ1) =
√
P (ρ0, ρ1). (7)
3 The suggested attack on MSC(99)
Let us, following MSC(99), define the normalized qubit states ψ(0) = c|0〉 + s|1〉 and
ψ(1) = c|0〉−s|1〉 where c, s are real numbers. Let Φ(bj) = ⊗nk=1ψ(bj), where bj ∈ {0, 1}.
A two element POVM with results {cj ;⊥} where cj ∈ {0, 1}, is defined in the following
way Ecj = |Φ(cj)〉〈Φ(cj)|, E⊥cj = 1 − Ecj . Whenever the result ⊥ is obtained the result
of the protocol is abort.
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We will now describe in detail an explicate attack on the MSC(99) protocol. We assume
w.l.o.g that the cheater, whom we call Bob*, wishes to create a bias towards 0 and that
Alice is acting honestly throughout the protocol. We assume for the sake of simplicity
that when both participants act honestly the probability for ⊥ is 0. In the parenthesis
we shall describe what an honest Bob does according to MSC(99).
Step 1 For j = 1, . . . , m do:
Alice chooses randomly a bit aj ∈ {0, 1}.
Bob* does nothing.
(Bob chooses a random bit bj ∈ {0, 1}. )
Step 2 For i = 1, . . . , n do: For j = 1, . . . , m do:
Alice uniformly picks at random a bit cij and sends a pair of qubits in the state
ψ(cij)⊗ ψ(c¯ij).
Bob* picks at random a bit dij and prepares the following entangled state
|η〉 = 1√
2m
∑
b
(
m⊗
j=1
n⊗
i=1
ψ(bj ⊕ dij)ψ(b¯j ⊕ dij))|b〉B (8)
where the {|b〉}2mb=1 are 2m orthogonal vectors in the Hilbert space HB, |b〉 =
⊗mj=1|bj〉.
Bob* sends Alice the state ρ = trB|η〉〈η|.
(Bob uniformly picks a random bit dij and sends a pair of qubits in the product
state ψ(dij)ψ(d¯ij).)
Step 3 For i = 1, . . . , n do:For j = 1, . . . , m do:
Alice announces eij = aj ⊕ cij and Bob* returns the second qubit at position (i, j)
if eij = 0 and the first qubit otherwise. The Hilbert space of the qubits Bob* sends
back will be called HABA, and the qubits that Bob* keeps belong to the Hilbert
space HAB.
Bob* announces fij = dij and Alice returns the second qubit at position (i, j) if
fij = 0 and the first qubit otherwise. The Hilbert space of the qubits Alice returns
is HBAB. The Hilbert space of the qubits Alice keeps is HBA.
At this stage, the qubits in HAB, for every j are in the state Φ(aj). The qubits
in HABA are in the state Φ(a¯j). The mn qubits in HBAB are entangled with
the mn qubits in HBA and with the register in HB. Let us define: |Ψlb〉A,B =⊗m
j=lΦ(bj)AΦ(b¯j)B then the entangled state shared by Alice and Bob* is:
|η′〉 = 1√
2m
∑
b
|Ψ1b〉BA,BAB|b〉B. (9)
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(Bob announces fij = bj ⊕ dij and Alice returns the second qubit at position (i, j)
if fij = 0 and the first qubit otherwise.)
Step 4A For j = 1, . . . , l − 1 do:
Alice announces aj , Bob* executes the POVM (Eaj , E
⊥
aj
) on Φ(aj) notes the out-
come a˜j and if a˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.
Bob* measures the following two element POVM Dj0 = |0〉〈0| and Dj1 = |1〉〈1| in
HB on the j-th qubit. If he gets the result Dj0 he announces bj = 0 and if he receives
the result Dj1 he announces bj = 1. Alice executes the POVM (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) on Φ(bj)
if the outcome is b˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.
At this stage the entangled state in HBA⊗HBAB⊗HB is:
|η′′〉 = 1√
2m−j
∑
b′
|Ψj+1b′ 〉BA,BAB|b′〉B (10)
where b′ ∈ {0, 1}m−j.
(Bob announces bj , Alice executes the POVM (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) on Φ(bj), if the outcome
is b˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.)
Step 4B For j = l do:
Alice announces al Bob* executes the above POVM on Φ(al) and if a˜l = ⊥ the
protocol aborts.
Let:
ρ0C(k) =
1
2m−k
∑
{ak |⊕m
j=k
aj=0}
(
m⊗
j=k
Φ(aj)Φ
†(aj)) (11)
ρ1C(k) =
1
2m−k
∑
{ak |⊕m
j=k
aj=1}
(
m⊗
j=k
Φ(aj)Φ
†(aj)) (12)
where C ∈ {A,B} and ak ∈ {0, 1}m−k. Bob* measures the remaining (m−(l+1))n
qubits in HAB with the POVM that distinguishes maximally between ρ0B(l+1) and
ρ1B(l + 1) and obtains the result A˜
′′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Bob* then measures the following POVM on HB
F0 =
∑
{b′′|⊕m
j=l
bj=0}
|b′′〉〈b′′| (13)
and
F1 =
∑
{b′′|⊕m
j=l
bj=1}
|b′′〉〈b′′| (14)
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where b′′ ∈ {0, 1}m−l+1, and obtains the result F ∈ {0, 1}. Bob* calculates the
following expression X˜ = ⊕lj=1a˜j⊕l−1j=1 bj⊕A˜′′⊕F . At this stage the state entangled
between Bob* and Alice is the following:
|η′′(F )〉 = 1√
2m−l
∑
{b′′|
∑m
j=l
bj=F}
|Ψlb′′〉BA,BAB|b′′〉B (15)
and the state in HBA is ρFA(l) = TrB,BAB(|η′′(F )〉〈η′′(F )|).
If X˜ = 0, Bob* measures the POVM with the elements
BFb′′ = |b′′〉〈b′′|, (16)
where b′′ = {b′′| ⊕mj=l b′′j = F}. Bob* obtains the result b′′ and announces b′′l .
If X˜ = 1 Bob* does the following:
We know from (4) that:
u = P (ρ1B(l), ρ
0
B(l)) = max | 〈η′′(F¯ )|UBη′′(F )〉 |2 (17)
where maximization is done over all unitary transformations UB in HB. Let U∗B be
the transformation that achieves the maximum, then U∗B|η′′(F )〉 can be written in
the following way:
U∗B|η′′(F )〉 =
√
ueiθ|η′′(F¯ )〉+√1− ueiϕ|η′′(F¯ )〉
=
√
u
2m−l
eiθ
∑
{b′′|⊕m
j=l
bj=F¯}
|Ψlb′′〉BA,BAB|b′′〉B
+
√
1− ueiϕ|η′′(F¯ )〉. (18)
Bob* applies the transformation U∗B on HB, and measures a POVM with the ele-
ments Bbˆ′′ , where bˆ
′′ = {b′′|⊕mj=lb′′j = F¯}. When Bob obtains the result bˆ′′ = bˆ′′l . . . bˆ′′m
he announces bˆ′′l . Otherwise he chooses randomly a bˆ′′ where ⊕mk=lbˆ′′k = F¯ .
Alice executes the POVM (Ebl , E
⊥
bl
) on the l-th qubit if the outcome is b˜l = ⊥ the
protocol aborts.
(Bob announces bl. Alice executes the POVM (Ebl , E
⊥
bl
) on Φ(bl) if the outcome is
b˜l = ⊥ the protocol aborts.)
Step 4C For j = l + 1, . . . , m do:
Alice announces aj Bob* does nothing.
Bob* announces b′′j if X˜ = 0 or bˆ
′′
j if X˜ = 1. Alice executes the POVM (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
)
on the j-th qubit, if the outcome is b˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.
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The result of the coin tossing will be X = ⊕lj=1a˜j ⊕mj=l+1 aj ⊕mj=1 b˜j = ⊕lj=1a˜j ⊕
A′′ ⊕l−1j=1 b˜j ⊕ B˜.
(Bob announces bj . Alice executes the POVM (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) on Φ(bj) if the outcome is
b˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.)
Step 5 For j = 1 . . .m do:
Alice measures the state Φ(a¯j) returned by Bob* at position j with the POVM
(Ea¯j , E
⊥
a¯j
) and if the outcome is ⊥ the protocol aborts.
Bob* measures the state Φ(b¯j) returned by Alice at position j with the POVM
(Eb¯j , E
⊥¯
bj
) and if the outcome is ⊥ the protocol aborts.
(Bob measures the state Φ(b¯j) returned by Alice at position j with the POVM
(Eb¯j , E
⊥¯
bj
) and if the outcome is ⊥ the protocol aborts.)
4 Analysis of the attack
Let us calculate the bias Bob* created on the distribution of the correct results (0, 1) of
the protocol . In order to obtain this bias we must calculate what is the probability that
the result of the coin tossing is 0 and that the protocol is found to be correct. This will
be in our case p(X = 0) because for z ∈ {0, 1,⊥} we have that z ⊕⊥ = ⊥.
The probability that the result of the coin tossing is 0 or ⊥, is the same as the probability
that A˜′′ = A′′, because whenever Bob* obtains an error at step 4B the protocol’s result
is 1 or ⊥. This probability is:
p(A˜′′ = A′′) = 1− PE(ρ0B(l + 1), ρ1B(l + 1)) = 1− PEl+1B (ρ0, ρ1). (19)
Since we assume Alice is acting honestly,and until step 4B Bob* always gives Alice results
that coincide with what Bob would have told her, ( With probability one the protocol
does not abort until that step, since we assumed that the honest protocol aborts with
probability zero.) therefore the probability that the protocol succeeds is: p(X 6= ⊥) =
p(B˜ 6= ⊥). In the case Bob* obtains in step 4B X˜ = 0:
p(B 6= ⊥) = ∑
b′′
p(b˜′′ = b′′)
=
∑
b′′
1
2m−l
|〈b′′|〈Φ( ˜b′′)|η′′(F )〉|2 = 1. (20)
If the result Bob* obtains in step 4B is X˜ = 1 the probability that the protocol succeeds
will be :
p(B 6= ⊥) = ∑
bˆ′′
p(b˜′′ = bˆ′′)
7
=
∑
bˆ′′
1
2m−l
|〈bˆ′′|〈Φ( ˜b′′)|U∗B(|η′′(F )〉)|2 (21)
≥ u = P (ρ0A(l), ρ1A(l)) = (F l(ρ0, ρ1))2. (22)
Bob obtains the results 0, 1 for A′′ with probability 1
2
. Therefore we obtain the following
expression for the probability Bob* cheats successfully:
p(X = 0) ≥ ∑
A′′
p(A′′)p(A˜′′ = A′′)p(B 6= ⊥)
=
1
2
(1− PEl+1(ρ0, ρ1)(1 + (F l(ρ0, ρ1))2). (23)
The next step is an explicit calculation of (23). The probability of error in guessing the
parity bit of a string of q bits with parameters c,s was found in [8] to be:
PEq(ρ0, ρ1) =
1− (2cs)q
2
. (24)
The fidelity between the two density matrices was calculated in [13] with the result:
F q(ρ0, ρ1) =
[m−q
2
]∑
k=0
(
m− q
k
)
|c2(m−q−k)s2k − c2ks2(m−q−k)|. (25)
Unlike the case of [8] and [13], in MSC(99) the quantum states that represent the two
possible values of the bit |Φ(0)〉, |Φ(1)〉 belong to H2n . However they span a two di-
mensional Hilbert space H′ therefore we can define c′2 − s′2 = (c2 − s2)n and write
|Φ(0)〉 = c′|0′〉 + s′|1′〉, |Φ(1)〉 = c′|0′〉 − s′|1′〉 where |0′〉, |1′〉 are two orthogonal vectors
in H′. Therefore we can use the results of [8] and [13] to write that:
p(X = 0) ≥ 1
4
(1 + (2c′s′)m−(l+1))
(1 + (
[m−l
2
]∑
k=0
(
m− l
k
)
|c′2(m−l−k)s′2k − c′2ks′2(m−l−k)|)2). (26)
A good approximation (for large m−l) of this expression can be obtained in the following
way: Let us define t = s′2, one easily recognizes that (25) is the statistical overlap of
two binomial distributions with mean t and 1− t. Since, the transformation k → m− k,
transforms one distribution to the other we can write
F l(ρ0, ρ1) = 2
[m−l
2
]∑
k=0
(
m− l
k
)
tk(1− t)m−l−k − 1. (27)
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Using the following theorem [14]
∑
k≤nt+α
√
t(1−t)n
(
n
k
)
tk(1− t)n−k = 1
2pi
∫ α
−∞
e
−x2
2 dx+O(
1√
n
) (28)
we have that
F l(ρ0, ρ1) ≈
√
2
pi
∫ α
−∞
e
−x2
2 dx− 1 (29)
where α =
√
(m−l)(1−2t)2
4(1−t)t . Therefore t =
1
2
− α
2
√
m−l+α2 if t ≤ 1 − t, and t = 12 + α2√m−l+α2
if t ≥ 1− t. This leads to the following bound for the fidelity
F l(ρ0, ρ1) ≈ Erf( α√
2
). (30)
For large m− l , we can simplify the probability that Bob* guessed correctly the result
of the protocol at step l + 1 in the following way:
1− PEl+1(ρ0, ρ1) ≥ 1− PEl(ρ0, ρ1) = 1 + (4t(1− t))
m−l
2
2
=
1 + (1− α2
m−l+α2 )
m−l
2
2
≈ 1 + e
−α2
2
4t(1−t)
2
(31)
≥ 1 + e
−α2
2
2
. (32)
Therefore the probability the protocol’s result is 0 is:
P (X = 0) ≈
(1 + e
−α2
2 )(1 + (Erf( α√
2
))2)
4
=
(1 +K)(1 + (Erf(
√− lnK))2)
4
. (33)
In MSC(99) (and in any reasonable coin-tossing protocol) K varies between a very small
number in the beginning of the protocol, ( (1− (c2−s2)2 logM)M in our case) to very close
to one at the end of the protocol, (1 − (c2 − s2)2 logM in our case)since K quantifies the
participant’s knowledge about the protocol’s result. Figure 1 (below) shows that Bob*’s
9
bias is larger then 1/2 for all 0 < K < 1 and that it reaches it’s maximum 0.09195 when
K = 0.510964.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
K
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Bias
Fig 1. Bob*’s bias during the protocol
These results do not depend on the parameters (c,s,n,m) of the protocol, (as long as m is
large enough and c not to close to 1/2 which are necessary for the protocol to be secure
and correct.) the bias created by Bob* is intrinsic to the information fidelity tradeoff
of the parity bit problem. In addition it gives us a constructive answer when should
a cheater attack in order to the obtain maximum bias for our attack. If we use the
parameters suggested in MSC(99) (c2 − s2 = cos pi
9
, n = logm ,m) a simple calculation
shows that the optimal attack is when l = log0.510964
log
√
(1−(cos pi
9
)2logm
of the m bits have not been
revealed.
It is important to note that we have not claimed that this attack achieves maximum
bias. The attack we suggested is oblivious to the exact structure of the density matri-
ces ρ0C(k), ρ
1
C(k), therefore it is possible that a cheater can create a larger bias on the
protocol’s result by taking the structure of these density matrices into consideration.
5 Conclusion
The results obtained above do not completely obliterate the possibility of achieving a
secure quantum coin tossing using a slow symmetric protocol such as MSC(99). The
attack we suggested on such protocols shows, that protocols using this method must
take great care of the tradeoff (such as in (23)) between the information a participant
can obtain about the protocol’s result and the fidelity between the density matrices
representing the protocol’s possible results, during the course of the protocol.
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